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Abstract 
In this paper we develop the first (static) microsimulation model aimed at studying the 
distributive impact of housing taxation on Italian households. We use as input data 
those provided by the Bank of Italy from its Survey on Households Income and Wealth, 
and discuss specific problems arising in the evaluation of cadastral income and of the 
Property Tax base. Our estimates of the distribution of taxpayers are very close to the 
Ministry of Finance official statistics; hence, our model can be seen as a reliable tool to 
evaluate the current distribution of housing taxation and the impact of potential tax 
reforms. Our simulations suggest that both Property Tax and Waste Management Tax 
show a moderate regressive impact with respect to household gross income, whilst the 
Personal Income Tax on dwellings other than the main residence is progressive. We 
then provide an application of our model, to study the Property Tax reform in 2008. Our 
findings show that all households owning the main residence gain from the 2008 
reform, but tax cuts are mostly concentrated on the top three deciles of household 
equivalent gross income, so that the richest benefit most. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the importance of housing in influencing citizens’ well-being, the large share 
that housing represents in citizens’ wealth, and the large share of income devoted to 
expenditures for its maintenance, housing taxation is an understudied topic that deserves 
more attention, both from a positive and a normative perspective. For instance, from a 
positive perspective, questions arise in order to explain the current distribution of 
housing taxes and how they impact on the distribution of resources; from a normative 
point of view, it is important to understand how an ‘optimal tax’ on housing can be 
designed. 
The absence of almost any study on the issue of housing taxation is magnified in the 
case of countries where taxes have been used – together with other policies - to favour 
homeownership. Italy is an important case study in this respect for many reasons. Like 
in other Mediterranean countries (e.g., Spain), the Italian Tax Code basically exempts 
the figurative income from homeownership, while contemporaneously allowing for tax 
credits in the case of mortgage interests, creating a clear favour for owner-occupiers 
(e.g., Baldini, 2010). These fiscal advantages for home-owners reasonably increased 
given the international trends in market prices, which - differently from tax bases - 
soared in recent years. Moreover, differently from other countries, Italy shares with the 
Mediterranean countries also a high number of owner-occupiers coupled with a system 
of public pensions particularly generous, generating a substantial redistribution in 
favour of the elderly (e.g., Ferrera and Castles, 1996). In particular, the share of owner-
occupied housing has increased strongly since 1977, reaching 72% of Italian households 
in the late 2000s, a figure close to that of Portugal (73%), but lower than Spain (83%); 
the share of owner-occupiers is instead lower in Continental European countries, like 
France and Germany, where these percentages amount to 58 and 46 respectively (e.g., 
Baldini, 2010). All these redistributive issues are coupled with increasing difficulties for 
those who do not own their house to afford housing expenses. On the one hand, public 
expenditures for housing represent only a mere 0.1 percent of welfare expenditures in 
Italy, compared with an average 3.5 percent in the EU countries (e.g., D’Alessio and 
Gambacorta, 2007; Baldini, 2010). On the other hand, given the increase in market 
values and the liberalization of rental markets occurred during the 1990s (with the 
2 
 
removal of upper limits), also rents increased noticeably. Hence, the non-owners found 
it increasingly difficult to buy a house or pay a rent, a situation that could be improved 
also by reforming housing taxation. 
However, no government has tried to propose a general reform of housing taxation 
to ameliorate the current situation, since the share of owners is high and the issue is 
politically sensitive. Not surprisingly, a recent reform of the Property Tax, implemented 
in 2008, increased even further advantages for owners, reasonably creating adverse 
redistributive effects in order to gain short-term political benefits. Unfortunately, the 
Italian government has not developed so far a model to assess the distribution of 
housing taxes, so that fiscal policy simulations are difficult to estimate. 
The aim of this paper is to fill the gap, by developing the first (static) 
microsimulation model explicitly devoted to the analysis of housing taxation in Italy. In 
particular, we are interested in two basic issues: first, we want to characterize the 
current distribution of taxes on housing, reconciling the (scant) aggregate figures on 
housing with those originating from micro data; second, we want to apply the 
microsimulation model to study the redistributive impact of fiscal reforms, and take the 
2008 reform of the Property Tax as a case study. We use as input data those provided by 
the Bank of Italy from its Survey on Households Income and Wealth, and discuss the 
specific problems arising in the evaluation of the cadastral income and the Property Tax 
base. The model replicates fairly well the distribution of taxpayers provided by the 
Ministry of Finance, which makes it a reliable tool to evaluate tax reforms on housing in 
Italy. Our simulations on the 2006 data suggest that both Property Tax and Waste 
Management Tax show a moderate regressive impact with respect to household gross 
income, whilst the Personal Income Tax on dwellings other than the main residence is 
progressive. Moreover, studying the Property Tax reform in 2008, our simulations show 
that all households owning the main residence gain from the 2008 reform, but tax cuts 
are mostly concentrated on the top three deciles of household gross income, so that the 
richest benefited most. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
institutional description of housing taxation in Italy. Section 3 describes the 
microsimulation model, discussing the distribution of cadastral incomes and the 
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simulations of main taxes on houses for Italian households. Section 4 offers a first 
application of the model, to study the distributive impact of the 2008 reform of the 
Property Tax. Section 5 briefly ends the paper. 
 
 
2. Housing taxation in Italy: institutional details 
Like in other developed countries, there are a number of different taxes on houses and 
buildings in the Italian tax legislation. Total tax revenues from housing amount to about 
40 billion of euro in the late 2000s, i.e. 2.7 percent of GDP and 5.9 percent of total tax 
revenues (Ministry of Finance, 2008). We can classify ‘housing taxes’ in two broad 
groups: a first group is identified by taxes on house ownership and dwelling utilization 
(54% of revenues); a second group considers taxes due when buying or selling, as well 
as restructuring a dwelling or any other kind of building (46% of revenues). Since our 
aim here is to develop a static microsimulation model for the analysis of housing 
taxation, we focus on the first group of taxes only, and limit our analysis to households, 
leaving aside buildings owned by (public and private) firms. The main taxes of the first 
group are: the Personal Income Tax (hereafter House-PIT), within which the (figurative) 
income from houses is taxed (about 7 billion euro); the Property Tax (hereafter ICI, 
from Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili, Municipal Tax on Buildings, about 5.2 billion 
euro that dropped to 2.4 billion after the 2008 ICI reform); and the Urban Waste 
Management Tax (hereafter TARSU, from Tassa per lo Smaltimento dei Rifiuti Solidi 
Urbani, about 3 billion euro). In what follows we briefly describe the institutional 
details of House-PIT, ICI and TARSU. 
House-PIT. Incomes from dwellings are determined in different ways according to 
the kind of use, and imputed to each owner or life-tenant1 according to her percentage of 
ownership. Current rules in the Tax Code identify income for the taxpayer dwelling as 
the ‘cadastral income’, i.e. a hypothetical rent based on the property description and 
valuation listed in the local Land Register (the so-called Catasto Fabbricati), which was 
last revised in 1939 and is clearly far from current market values. Income from 
                                                 
1 The life-tenant retains the right (which is legally labelled ‘usufruct’) to freely use the dwelling for all her 
life. The owner then has just the ‘bare property’ of the building, but no rights to use it. 
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unoccupied or holiday homes is equal to cadastral income augmented by one third. 
Finally, income from rented dwellings is equal to 85 percent of the actual rent. As for 
the owners, from 2001 onwards the income from the main residence is exempted from 
PIT tax base; on the contrary, income from other dwellings is included in the taxable 
income. Mortgage interests and maintenance expenditures allow the owner a tax credit. 
As for the renters, up to 2008 no tax credits were allowed for the main residence. At 
present, a tax credit related to personal income of the renter (up to about 30,000 euro) is 
allowed; it is higher for renters younger than 30 years old. 
ICI. Since 1993 a Property Tax (ICI) on each dwelling has been introduced. The tax 
unit is the individual according to her percentage of ownership. Tax revenues accrue 
directly to each Municipality where the buildings are located. In principle, the ICI tax 
base should be the market value of the dwelling; in practice, this is not the case since it 
is evaluated by simply multiplying the cadastral income by 1002. Each Municipality can 
choose the tax rate in a range between a minimum of 0.4 percent and a maximum of 0.7. 
Up to 2007, a tax credit on the main residence was available. Starting from 2008, no ICI 
is due on the main residence (Pellegrino, 2007, for further details). 
TARSU. Waste management services are financed by a tax directly accruing to 
municipalities that manage the service. The taxpayers are the households living in the 
dwellings (regardless of their tenure status), and those owning unoccupied or holiday 
homes. Contrary to what one could expect, the tax debt is not related to the amount of 
waste produced by each household, but to the size of the house. In particular, tax debt is 
determined by multiplying a tariff per square meter by the total surface of the dwelling. 
Some tax reductions are allowed for people living alone, unoccupied dwellings, and 
poor households. 
 
 
3. The Microsimulation Model 
The microsimulation model used in this paper estimated the most important taxes and 
contributions characterizing the Italian fiscal system, concentrating in particular on the 
                                                 
2 The value of the dwelling is then equal to the perpetual annuity of the cadastral income with a 1 percent 
discount rate. 
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main taxes on housing. This marks a striking difference with respect to other 
comparable tax-benefit model, like EUROMOD, used to study for instance the impact 
of the mortgage interest tax relief within the PIT, but with no clear focus on taxes on 
houses and buildings (e.g., Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2007). The model considers as 
input data those provided by the Bank of Italy in its 2008 Survey on Households Income 
and Wealth (hereafter SHIW-BI). The Survey contains information on household 
income and wealth in the year 2006, covering 7,768 households, and 19,848 individuals. 
The sample is representative of the Italian population3, composed by about 23,5 million 
households and 60 million individuals. Relevant information for the analysis of housing 
taxation in the SHIW-BI include: the overall net income, the market value of real 
estates, the size (in square meters) of the dwellings, the dwelling maintenance 
expenditures, the interests paid on mortgage, and the initial mortgage debt. Notice that 
the SHIW-BI net income is defined on a personal basis, while mortgage interests and 
real estates information are available only at the household level. However, by 
exploiting information on the ownership shares, it is possible to evaluate the value of 
real estates also at the individual level. We then start by simulating income and taxes at 
the individual level, and then aggregate results at the household level. 
The National Land Agency estimates the total number of residence dwellings to be 
30.8 million: 26.2 million (85 percent) are owned by households, while the remaining 
4.6 million (15 percent) are owned by public and private firms. These are the only 
available information at the aggregate level on real estates in Italy, since the National 
Land Agency statistics refer only to dwelling characteristics and not also to dwelling 
owners. In what follows we clearly limit our analysis to the 26.2 million of dwellings 
owned by households. 
There are a number of problems to be solved in order to appropriately simulate 
housing taxation starting from SHIW-BI. First, we need to calibrate the model, 
attributing second homes to households in order to make SHIW-BI data compatible 
with aggregate statistics provided by the Ministry of Finance and the Land Register. 
Second, we need to evaluate cadastral values for given current market values. Third, we 
need to reconstruct gross incomes starting from net incomes provided in the survey. 
                                                 
3 See Brandolini (1999) and Bank of Italy (2008) for details. 
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Fourth, we need to aggregate incomes at the household level, and define an equivalent 
income for the redistributive analysis. In the following, we discuss solutions for each of 
these problems in turn. 
Table 1 shows the composition of households by tenure status focusing on main 
residences according to the SHIW-BI. Total households are about 23.5 million: 16.1 
million (68.7 percent) are the owner-occupiers of their main residence4; 0.7 million (3.1 
percent) life-tenants; 5 million (21.3 percent) rent or occupy it under “redemption 
agreement” (the so-called “a riscatto”), while 1.6 million (7.0 percent) are rent-free 
tenants (and in 92 percent of the cases, the dwelling is owned by relatives or friends)5. 
Table 1: Households main residences composition by tenure status 
Tenure Status Composition 
Owner occupiers (with or without mortgage) 68.7 
Life-tenants 3.1 
Tenants or occupiers under redemption agreement 21.3 
Rent-free tenants 7.0 
Total 100.0 
Note: The total number of households is 23,481,999. 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI.  
Even if the number and the composition of main residences are reliable, the SHIW-
BI dataset underestimates the total number of dwellings other than the main residence. 
In particular, about 3.5 million households (hence 3.5 million dwellings) declares to rent 
the main residence from other households, while the dwellings the interviewee declare 
to rent to other households are about 0.8 million; the gap is 2.7 million dwellings. 
Similarly, about 1.5 million households (1.5 million dwellings) declares to be rent-free 
tenants, while the dwellings the interviewee declare to rent free of charge to other 
households are about 0.5 million; the gap is 1 million dwellings. Finally, in the SHIW-
BI dataset there are only 2.2 million unoccupied dwellings or holiday homes, while they 
                                                 
4 Almost all the owner-occupiers (88.7 percent) are not burdened with a mortgage, while only a small 
percentage (11.3 percent) have a mortgage. 
5 As for tenants, almost 70 percent rent the house from other households; 25.7 percent of tenants rent 
from public bodies, like the Istituto Autonomo Case Popolari (a locally funded Institute providing 
housing to the poor), but also – to a minor extent - Regions, Provinces, Municipalities; and 4 percent from 
private firms. 
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are expected to be twice as many, as this number is computed by subtracting from the 
total number of dwellings all the other categories previously analyzed. 
There are two possible explanations for the underestimation of the number of 
dwellings in SHIW-BI: first, the interviewee do not declare the exact number of 
unoccupied dwellings or holiday homes and rented dwellings as well as dwellings 
rented free of charge (Coromaldi and Guerrera, 2009); second, it is not guaranteed that 
the original SHIW-BI sample contains a representative sub-sample of Italian households 
owning dwellings other than the main residence. 
Since SHIW-BI information on the number and on the characteristics of the main 
residences is reliable, we use this information in order to reconcile the number of 
dwellings other than the main residence owned by households with aggregate statistics 
published by the National Land Agency. This calibration is important to obtain a 
reliable estimation of revenues from housing taxes, and to correctly evaluate the 
distribution of housing taxation among households. In order to solve the problem, we 
then consider the whole SHIW-BI sub-sample of households owning at least the main 
residence and randomly attribute the missing dwellings. Excluding owner occupied 
dwellings (16.1 million), our estimates suggest that the total number of other dwellings 
owned by households is about 10 million. Table 2 reports the estimated composition by 
type of utilization: 0.7 million (6.8 percent) are used by life-tenants, 3.5 million (35 
percent) are rented to other families, 1.5 million (14.9 percent) are given up free of 
charge, while the unoccupied dwelling and holiday homes are 4.3 million (43.3 
percent). 
Table 2: Composition of second homes owned by households by type of utilization 
Type of utilization Composition 
Life-tenants households 6.8 
Free-rented to households 14.9 
Rented to households 35.0 
Unoccupied dwellings or holiday homes 43.3 
Total 100.0 
Note: The total number of dwellings is 10,052,261. 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
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Once the number and the composition of dwellings owned by households have been 
properly estimated, another problem to be solved in order to correctly analyze housing 
taxation through our microsimulation model is the estimation of the cadastral value and 
the cadastral income of each dwelling. This is important since it represents the ICI and 
House-PIT tax base, respectively, to be imputed to each taxpayer. The National Land 
Agency estimates the number and the composition as well as the overall cadastral value 
of dwellings (i.e., the overall ICI tax base). The SHIW-BI dataset contains information 
on the current market value of each dwelling owned by households. We compare these 
two aggregate values in order to obtain the average underestimation of overall cadastral 
values with respect to overall market values. Then, we impute the same percentage of 
underestimation (which is approximately equal to 77 percent) to the current value of 
each dwelling declared by each interviewee. By dividing the result by 100, and using 
the percentage of ownership of each person within the household, we obtain the 
cadastral income included in each taxpayer’s definition of PIT gross income. No 
specific problems arise in the simulation of TARSU, since it is linked to the size of the 
dwelling. 
Once incomes from housing have been identified, as the SHIW-BI provides 
information on each individual net income, we need to estimate the gross income for 
each taxpayer. Since the SHIW-BI definition of each individual net income is different 
from the Tax Code definition, the microsimulation model first distinguishes all incomes 
included in the PIT taxable income definition, incomes exempt from any taxes, and 
incomes taxed under a separate regime. The PIT gross income distribution is then 
evaluated starting from the net income distribution. The transition from the post- to the 
pre-tax personal income of each individual has been computed by applying the 
algorithm proposed by Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001). Using original sample 
weights, the grossing-up procedure simply proportions the sum of individuals’ sample 
weights to the dimension of the population as estimated by the National Statistical 
Office (ISTAT). Then the grossed-up number of PIT taxpayers has been obtained by 
considering individuals with a positive gross income within the microsimulation model. 
Finally, we aggregate net and gross incomes at the household level. The gross 
income is equal to the sum of PIT gross income, family benefits (the so-called Assegni 
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al Nucleo Familiare, a small cash transfer varying with the number of children and 
income), incomes exempt from taxation, gross incomes from financial assets, gross 
incomes taxed under a separate regime. The net income is equal to the gross income net 
of all taxes considered in the model: PIT, taxes on financial assets, taxes due on income 
taxed under a separate regime, ICI, TARSU, and IRAP (the regional tax on the value 
added). We subtract the mortgage interests from the result. In the following analysis, we 
consider all households in the dataset; in particular, we do not drop households with 
zero household income in order to obtain results on a homogeneous sample. In order to 
obtain the equivalent income we adopt the Cutler Scale (CS), defined as: 
  CA NNCS   
where 10  AN  and 10  CN  are, respectively, the number of adults and children6 
within each household, whilst 10   is the parameter assigning a different weight to 
children with respect to adults, and 10    indicates the ‘scale economies’ attached to 
the equivalence scale7. 
 
 
4. Simulation results 
In this section we discuss the results of our simulation exercise of the main taxes on 
housing. We begin by comparing statistics from our model with official statistics, and 
then describe the main findings from the simulation. 
In order to assess the “goodness –of-fit” of the model, we compare in particular our 
results with the Ministry of Finance official statistics. Unfortunately, statistics on 
House-PIT are available only at the individual level, while no official statistics on ICI 
and TARSU distribution have been ever published. As a consequence, we first compare 
                                                 
6 We consider here children all individuals within the household aged 17 or less. 
7 Different equivalence scales have been proposed. The Cutler and Kats scale is the most general, since 
most of the other equivalence scales can be obtained by varying its parameters. It can be also useful in 
sensitivity analysis. More precisely, according to van de Ven and Creedy (2005) methodology, a close 
approximation of the government implicit scale can be obtained by choosing scale parameters that 
minimise the re-ranking. 
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the PIT module results of the microsimulation by considering the individual as the 
reference tax unit; we then discuss results at the household level. 
Table 3 presents the differences between the simulation results and the official 
statistics from the Ministry of Finance, in terms of numbers of taxpayers and average 
gross income. As can be gauged from the table, differences are proportionally very 
small. 
Notice that only statistics on employees and pensioners (who represents 87.1 per 
cent of the overall taxpayers), as well as self-employed taxpayers are fully comparable, 
since the Ministry of Finance official statistics do not specifically focus on taxpayers 
having only other kind of incomes (e.g., only income from dwellings). 
The estimated number of employees and pensioners within the microsimulation 
model is, respectively, 0.5 and 0.3 percent lower than the official figure, while the 
number of self-employed taxpayers is 4.4 percent higher. On the contrary, the estimated 
number of ‘other’ (non working) taxpayers appears to be substantially different from 
official statistics (81.6 percent higher). The explanation of this huge difference is quite 
simple: by considering all observation within the SHIW dataset, the microsimulation 
model is able to identify all taxpayers with a positive gross income, while official 
statistics cannot consider taxpayers for whom the tax return form presentation is not 
compulsory according to Italian rules; this happens for instance when taxpayer’s gross 
income is represented by the main residence cadastral income only. 
Table 4 presents the PIT gross income distribution by income classes. Again, 
official statistics are very close to our estimates. Some differences can be observed only 
for the number of taxpayers belonging to the classes 0-3, 15-20 and 29-40 thousands 
euro. 
Given the good approximation of the model, we now discuss simulation results on 
‘housing taxes’ more in detail. We start from the estimates of cadastral incomes. About 
16.8 million of households own the dwelling where they live. According to the SHIW-
BI dataset, about 50 percent of main residences are owned only by one individual, while 
the other 50 percent have two or more owners. As a consequence, PIT taxpayers with a 
positive main residence cadastral income are about 24.3 million (40.5 percent of the 
population). 
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Table 3: Composition of PIT taxpayers and mean gross income by work status 
Year 2006 Number of taxpayers Mean gross income (euro) 
Work status Microsimulation model (A) 
Ministry of 
Finance official 
statistics (B) 
(A)/(B) Microsimulation model (C) 
Ministry of 
Finance official 
statistics (D) 
(C)/(D) 
Employee 19,790,570 19,898,390 99.5 21,121 21,229 99.5 
Pensioner 15,282,140 15,329,420 99.7 15,717 16,103 97.6 
Self-employed 4,165,622 3,989,143(1) 104.4 18,768 18,697(3) 100.4 
Other taxpayer 2,255,637 1,241,749(2) 181.6 2,063  - - 
Total 41,493,969 40,458,702 102.6 17,858 18,324 97.5 
Note: (1) The statistic considers taxpayers with VAT code.     
          (2) The number of these taxpayers has been evaluated as difference.    
          (3) The mean value has been obtained considering taxpayers with positive and negative incomes.   
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI and Ministry of Finance 2008.    
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Table 4: Gross income distribution by income classes (all taxpayers) 
Year 2006 Microsimulation model Ministry of Finance official statistics 
Income class (euro) Composition Mean (euro) Composition Mean (euro) 
0-1.000 6.8 344 5.0 453 
1.000-3.000 3.7 2,000 5.1 1,934 
3.000-5.000 3.7 4,065 4.1 3,998 
5.000-7.500 11.7 6,243 12.2 6,093 
7.500-10.000 6.9 9,037 8.3 12,365 
10.000-15.000 17.9 12,543 16.6 12,586 
15.000-20.000 20.6 17,363 16.9 17,409 
20.000-25.000 11.2 22,466 11.7 22,316 
25.000-29.000 5.8 27,047 6.2 26,862 
29.000-40.000 5.8 34,201 7.4 33,355 
40.000-50.000 2.1 44,076 2.3 44,373 
50.000-70.000 2.2 58,374 2.0 58,554 
70.000-100.000 1.1 82,539 1.2 82,242 
100.000-150.000 0.4 123,343 0.5 119,149 
oltre 150.000 0.3 298,685 0.3 284,662 
Totale 100.0 17,858 100.0 18,324 
Note: The total number of taxpayers is 41,493,969.   
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI and Ministry of Finance 2008.  
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Considering PIT taxpayers, Table 5 shows that the average cadastral income is 363 
euro, and it is slightly increasing with respect to the PIT gross income: it ranges from 
219 euro for taxpayers with PIT gross income less than 1 thousand euro, and about one 
thousand euro for taxpayers with PIT gross income higher than 150 thousand euro. 
Table 5: Distribution of the main residence cadastral income considering PIT 
taxpayers 
Income class (euro) Composition Mean (euro) 
0-1.000 9.7 219 
1.000-3.000 3.9 299 
3.000-5.000 3.0 252 
5.000-7.500 10.2 266 
7.500-10.000 6.3 345 
10.000-15.000 16.0 322 
15.000-20.000 19.0 354 
20.000-25.000 11.6 403 
25.000-29.000 6.4 432 
29.000-40.000 6.6 463 
40.000-50.000 2.3 590 
50.000-70.000 2.8 646 
70.000-100.000 1.5 744 
100.000-150.000 0.4 920 
Above 150.000 0.4 1,010 
Total 100.0 363 
Note: The total number of taxpayers is 24,319,766. 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
Even if the distribution of the main residence cadastral income is quite close to 
official statistics provided by the Ministry of Finance, both the estimated number of 
taxpayers with a positive main residence cadastral income and its average value are very 
different (15.7 million and 470 euro, respectively). These differences depend on the data 
available to the Ministry of Finance, which exclude a large share of taxpayers with only 
dependent labour incomes besides their own residence. Whenever a taxpayer possesses 
only dependent employment incomes and the main residence cadastral income, 
presentation of the tax return form is not compulsory (being the main residence 
cadastral income fully deductible from the PIT gross income), so that only information 
on wage incomes are sent to the Ministry of Finance by her employer. In these cases, no 
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information are available on the main residence cadastral income. Moreover, as 
discussed above, official statistics cannot consider taxpayers for whom the tax return 
form presentation is not compulsory, whilst the microsimulation model has detailed 
information to estimate all income earned by each interviewee. As a consequence, our 
estimates are to be considered more reliable. 
Table 6 reports the distribution of all incomes from dwellings. This statistic 
considers main residence cadastral incomes plus incomes from unoccupied or holiday 
homes, as well as incomes from rented dwellings. PIT taxpayers with a positive income 
from dwellings are about 26.4 million. The mean value is equal to 1,455 euro, and – 
differently from statistics in Table 5 - it increases sharply with respect to the PIT gross 
income: it ranges from 276 euro for taxpayers with PIT gross income less than 1 
thousand euro, and about ten thousand euro for taxpayers with PIT gross income above 
150 thousand euro. This steep gradient can be due to the generosity of the Italian tax 
system towards housing, which induced households to invest much of their wealth in 
housing than in alternative financial assets. 
Table 6: Distribution of overall income from dwellings considering PIT taxpayers 
Income class (euro) Composition Mean (euro) 
0-1.000 9.8 276 
1.000-3.000 4.1 586 
3.000-5.000 2.9 708 
5.000-7.500 10.0 541 
7.500-10.000 6.2 784 
10.000-15.000 15.6 724 
15.000-20.000 18.5 784 
20.000-25.000 11.7 1,305 
25.000-29.000 6.5 1,702 
29.000-40.000 6.8 2,645 
40.000-50.000 2.5 3,745 
50.000-70.000 2.9 6,031 
70.000-100.000 1.5 10,816 
100.000-150.000 0.5 21,733 
Above 150.000 0.4 10,315 
Total 100.0 1,455 
Note: The total number of taxpayers is 26,446,945. 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
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Turning to households, Table 7 shows the distribution of households by deciles of 
equivalent gross income. Several insights emerge from the Table. First, the higher the 
decile, the higher the percentage of owner-occupier within each decile. However, since 
71.7 per cent of households own their main residence, the gap between the first and the 
last decile is relatively small (59.1 percent to 76.1 for household without mortgage and 
5.3 percent to 10.1 for households with mortgage). Second, the percentage of tenants 
within each decile is decreasing: it is 26.7 percent in the first decile and 10 percent in 
the top one. The same picture is observed for rent-free tenants. 
Table 7: Distribution of Households by tenure status and decile of equivalent net 
income 
Tenure status 
Decile 
Owner occupiers 
without mortgage 
or life-tenants 
Owner occupiers 
with mortgage 
Tenants or 
occupiers under 
redemption 
agreement 
Rent-free 
tenants Total 
1  59.1  5.3  26.7  8.9  100.0  
2  59.6  4.1  27.2  9.1  100.0  
3  59.3  7.1  24.0  9.7  100.0  
4  62.1  7.1  22.2  8.6  100.0  
5  60.3  7.6  25.4  6.7  100.0  
6  65.9  9.1  19.4  5.6  100.0  
7  64.1  9.1  20.8  6.0  100.0  
8  63.2  11.9  19.7  5.2  100.0  
9  67.6  10.1  16.5  5.8  100.0  
10  76.1  10.1  10.0  3.8  100.0  
Total 63.6  8.1  21.3  7.0  100.0  
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI.    
 
At the household level, the overall average value of the main residence cadastral 
income is 524 euro. It increases with respect to income deciles, but not as much as 
could be expected: it is 366 euro in the first decile and only 904 euro (about 2.5 times) 
in the last one (Table 8). Moreover, the ratio between the main residence cadastral 
income and the household income is decreasing with income: it is 5 per cent in the first 
decile and only 1.9 percent in the last. Since the ICI tax base is based on cadastral 
income, the ICI tax is then expected to be regressive. 
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Table 8: Value of main residence cadastral income by decile of household 
equivalent gross income 
Decile 
Percentage of 
households with 
positive main 
residence 
cadastral income 
Mean value of 
main residence 
cadastral income 
(euro) 
Mean value of 
main residence 
cadastral income 
/ household 
income 
1  64.4  366.4  5.0  
2  63.7  362.0  2.9  
3  66.4  367.3  2.3  
4  69.2  406.4  2.3  
5  67.9  494.3  2.5  
6  74.9  483.8  2.0  
7  73.2  508.6  1.8  
8  75.1  570.4  1.8  
9  77.7  668.0  1.7  
10  86.2  903.9  1.3  
Total 71.7  524.0  1.9  
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI.  
Focusing on dwellings other than the main residence, Table 9 reports the average 
incomes from housing by decile of household equivalent gross income. Recall that 
income from other dwellings owned by households is the cadastral income for 
unoccupied dwellings or holiday houses, as well as rented dwellings for which actual 
rent has not been included in the tax base; it is the actual rent for rented and declared 
dwellings. About one fourth of the households have at least one dwelling besides the 
main residence: the percentage is only 13.3 in the first decile and 53.1 in the last one. 
The richer the household, the higher the income from dwelling other than the main 
residence: it is only 964 euro for poorest households and about 14 thousands euro for 
the richest ones. 
Once the distribution of cadastral incomes has been evaluated, we are able to turn to 
the simulation of the distribution of House-PIT, ICI and TARSU taxes - which represent 
all taxes on house ownership and dwelling utilization - by decile of household 
equivalent gross income. As ICI is a Municipal tax, the simulation of the ICI tax 
liability paid by each taxpayer considers the overall average value of the tax rate and the 
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overall average value of the tax credit computed at the regional level. Similarly, the 
TARSU tax has been estimated considering the mean tariff per square meter. 
Table 9: Value of other housing income by decile of household equivalent gross 
income 
Decile 
Percentage of 
household with 
positive other 
housing income 
Mean value of 
other housing 
income (euro) 
Mean value of 
other housing 
income / 
household 
income 
1  13.3  964.2  11.6  
2  14.7  1,709.6  12.9  
3  18.0  1,847.2  11.3  
4  19.6  1,652.2  8.6  
5  21.6  2,402.1  11.7  
6  27.7  2,124.4  8.3  
7  21.9  2,526.6  8.5  
8  31.1  2,758.1  8.1  
9  40.9  4,922.8  12.0  
10  53.1  13,733.8  20.3  
Total 26.0  4,862.8  14.1  
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI.  
Figure 1 reports the incidence on gross income of ICI and TARSU on main 
residences by deciles of gross income; only households with positive ICI and TARSU 
are considered. Both taxes show a similar and moderately regressive impact: both ICI 
and TARSU are 1.2 percent for the first decile; ICI is 0.4 percent for the top one, while 
TARSU is 0.3 percent. This is not surprising: a proportional property tax could be 
progressive with respect to income whenever housing wealth is increasing with respect 
to income. But ICI do not consider real market values of dwellings, and the cadastral 
values are highly underestimated. A similar situation is experienced by the TARSU: tax 
debt is determined by multiplying a tariff per square meter by the total square meters of 
the dwelling. As long as income increases, the dimension of the dwelling does not 
increase proportionally. 
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Figure 1: Incidence of ICI and TARSU on main residences 
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Figure 2 reports the incidence of House-PIT, ICI and TARSU on dwellings other 
than the main residence. Only households with at least one dwelling other than the main 
residence are considered. The incidence of House-PIT is increasing: it is about 0.5 
percent for household belonging to the bottom decile and 6 percent for households 
belonging to the top one. For what it concerns ICI and TARSU, a similar picture with 
respect to that observed on main residences emerges: ICI paid on other dwellings is 2.1 
percent for the bottom decile and 0.8 percent for the top one; the corresponding values 
for TARSU are 1.3 and 0.3, respectively. 
To better characterize the tax progressivity of the system and the role of housing 
taxation, we consider the Kakwani index, which is defined as the difference between the 
concentration coefficient for taxes and the Gini coefficient for the gross income 
(Lambert, 2001). As for taxes, we consider the overall tax system and then we focus on 
each specific tax on housing considered in the paper. Table 10 reports Kakwani indices 
for the overall tax-benefit system, the House-PIT, ICI and TARSU. Differently from 
Figure 1 and 2, here we consider all households. The overall Kakwani index is 0.053. 
Both ICI and TARSU do not influence tax progressivity, while the House-PIT (which 
refers to the taxation of second homes, being the main residences exempt) explains 
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about 10% of the overall tax progressivity. This is not surprising given the high 
percentage of households with their wealth invested in real estates. Given this situation, 
the Italian policy maker should consider housing taxation and the reform of figurative 
rents as an important issue for enhancing tax progressivity of the system as a whole. 
However, this is not what happened in Italy during the last years, as we show in the next 
section taking as an example the 2008 Property Tax reform. 
Figure 2: Incidence of House-PIT, ICI and TARSU on dwellings other than the 
main residence 
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Table 10: Kakwani index 
Tax Kakwani index 
Overall tax-benefit system 0.05261
House-PIT 0.00515
ICI 0.00002
TARSU -0.00090
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI. 
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5. An application: the distributive impact of the 2008 housing taxation reform 
 
Besides studying the distribution of housing taxes in the current system, the 
microsimulation model developed in the paper is important to simulate the impact of a 
fiscal policy reform. Here we take as an example the 2008 reform of the Property Tax, 
that basically exempted the main residence. In principle, given the mild regressivity and 
the generosity of the current system, one would have expected to observe a reform 
aimed at reconciling cadastral incomes with current market values. Despite this, no 
reforms to introduce a sort of mark-to-market mechanisms for the update of cadastral 
income have been proposed in the last decades. On the contrary, given the high number 
of owner-occupiers, in order to gain political benefits, from 2008 ownership of the main 
residence is even exempted from taxation not only with respect to income taxation, but 
also with respect to the Property Tax. There are two main concerns about this reform: 
on the one hand, ICI is the most important local tax, so that revenues accruing to 
Municipalities decreased from about 12 billion euro in 2006 to about 9 billion euro in 
2008 (from 5.2 billion euro to 2.4 when considering only dwelling own by households), 
with the difference being covered by state transfers that limit the local government 
responsibility; on the other hand, as long as the ownership of the main residence 
increases the taxpayer ability to pay, the 2008 tax cuts go in the direction of lowering 
the progressive impact of the tax system as a whole. 
Table 11 shows the percentage of households with positive Property Tax both 
before and after the 2008 reform. In 2006, 16 percent of households with a positive ICI 
tax base (11.6 percent of all households) had to pay no ICI, since their tax credits were 
bigger than the gross ICI. Notice that even if tax credits were not linked to household 
income but to dwelling utilization, most of households actually exempted from the 
Property Tax were belonging to the left tail of income distribution. 
Before the reform about two third of households had a positive ICI. More precisely, 
about 60% of households had to pay the ICI on the main residence, whilst 30.6% paid 
ICI on other dwellings. As expected, the percentage of households is moderately 
increasing with gross income when main residences are considered (values range from 
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43 to 83.9%); they increase sharply when households owning second homes are 
considered (values range from 18.8 to 55.5%). 
After the 2008 reform, no owner occupier has to pay ICI on the main residence; the 
actual distribution of the tax is then the one observed on dwellings other than the main 
residence. Table 11 also shows the tax cuts distribution caused by the reform, which is 
clearly increasing with income deciles, and mostly concentrated in the top three deciles 
of the distribution: the top decile benefits one fourth of the overall tax cuts, while the 
share is 15 percent on the ninth and 11.7 on the eighth; on the other hand, the first decile 
gains only 4.7 percent, the second 4.8 percent and the third 5.3. The average reduction 
of tax debt is low: on average, it is about 200 euro, ranging from 142 on the bottom 
decile to 368 euro on the top one. 
To conclude, since the 1980s Italian taxpayers have shown a high sensibility with 
regards to housing taxation. This explains why both right and left parties have proposed 
tax cuts on the main residences, and still favor housing with respect to investment in 
alternative assets. Not surprisingly, political benefits from this reform have been 
consistent, even though taxpayers’ economic benefits have been very low in absolute 
value. A tax cut for everyone has no losers, but the distribution of benefits resulted in a 
more unequal distribution. 
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Table 11: Tax cuts distribution of the 2008 housing taxation reform 
  Households with positive ICI   
  2006 2008   
Decile Main residence 
Other 
dwellings Total 
Main 
residence
Other 
dwellings Total 
Distribution 
of the tax cuts 
between 2006 
and 2008 
1 43.0 18.8 49.4 0.0 18.8 18.8 4.7 
2 44.2 22.3 53.8 0.0 22.3 22.3 4.8 
3 48.6 24.7 57.0 0.0 24.7 24.7 5.3 
4 52.1 24.7 59.0 0.0 24.7 24.7 6.3 
5 57.9 25.6 63.2 0.0 25.6 25.6 8.6 
6 64.0 32.1 72.1 0.0 32.1 32.1 8.9 
7 65.6 26.1 70.9 0.0 26.1 26.1 9.5 
8 69.3 33.9 73.8 0.0 33.9 33.9 11.7 
9 74.2 44.0 80.5 0.0 44.0 44.0 15.0 
10 83.9 55.5 89.6 0.0 55.5 55.5 25.0 
Total 59.9 30.6 66.6 0.0 30.6 30.6 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW-BI.  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we develop a first (static) microsimulation model to study the distributive 
impact of housing taxation and fiscal policy reforms on Italian households. Our 
simulations suggest that both Property Tax and Waste Management Tax show a 
moderate regressive impact with respect to household gross income, whilst the Personal 
Income Tax on dwellings other than the main residence is progressive. In order to 
provide an application of our model, we then study the Property Tax reform in 2008, 
which basically exempted the main residence. All households owning the main 
residence gain from the 2008 reform, but tax cuts are mostly concentrated on the last 
three deciles of household equivalent gross income, so that the richest benefited most. 
The availability of a microsimulation model specifically devoted to study housing 
taxation can of course help in a number of directions. One first example is its use for the 
simulation of alternative policy reforms. For instance, an important question to be asked 
is relative to the impact of a policy aimed at reconciling cadastral values with market 
values. The enlargement of the tax base will allow the government to reduce tax wedges 
on capital and, more importantly, labour incomes. What are the expected effects on 
efficiency and those on equity is a question that deserves an answer, especially for a 
country – like Italy – where the reduction of the cost of labour is a highly debated issue. 
A second example is related to political economy issues: the microsimulation model 
will allow us to define net gainers and net losers when implementing a policy reform, 
hence explaining whether or not a given policy has any chances to be really 
implemented in terms of political support. 
Needless to say, the model can be further improved, in particular incorporating 
behavioural responses. As it is well known, a static model does not incorporate by 
definition individuals’ reactions to a change in tax policy parameters. For instance, we 
cannot answer to questions such as what happens to current market prices in the housing 
market when we include in the PIT tax base current market values. This is left for future 
research. 
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